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No. 9182 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 





i..·'~ ... DAIRY ROWLEY, _ 
1 :.~· F? 5- 1960 Plaintiff and Respondent, 
D 
-vs.- -···-·c;;~;k, -s-~-P~~-;;,~·-e;~~-ri~···iii~ ........ ~ 
:MILFORD CITY, a Municipal Corpo- h 
ration of the State of Utah; R. L. 
KIZER as Mayor of Milford City; 
A. S. WHITTAKER, JOHN DAVIS, 
\V. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and J. 
N. WESTON, as City Councilmen of 
said Milford City; V. M. BURNS, as 
City Recorder of said Milford City; 
ELWOOD JEFFE.RSON and 
ALENE JEF:B,ERSON, his wife; and 
MIKE L. BRIMBERRY and DORO-
THY BRIMBERRY, his wife; FIRS'T 
DOE, SECOND DOE and THIRD 
DOE, . 
Defendants, and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Beaver County 
RoN. WILL L. HoYT, Judge 
DURHAM MORRIS 
Attorney for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATE ME NT OF THE CASE---------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
CASES CITED 
Barton et al. v. Hackney, 224 P. (2d) 995____________________________________ 6 
Erickson, Executrix, etc. v. Boothe, 274 P. (2d) 460________________ 9 
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 80 P. (2d) 587------------------------ 10 
Greenstone v. ·Claretian 'Theological Seminary, 343 P. (2d) 161 9 
Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist. et al. 161 P 116________ 6 
Lewis & Queen vs. Edmondson & Sons et al. 248 P. (2d) 973____ 9 
National Bank of Anadarko v. First Nat. Bank of Anadarko, 
134 P. 866 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Stephani v. Abbott, 30 P. (2d) 1033__________________________________________ 9 
STATUTES CITED 
Sec. 104-13-13, U. C. A. 1943 ---------------------------------------------------------- 5 
RULES CITED 
Rule 15 (d) Federal Rules---------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
TEXTS CITED 
Sec. 455, Page 945, Vol. 1, Barron & Hoitzoff Federal 
Practice and Procedure------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
10 Hillyers Forms of Pleading and Practice, Pages 
9572-9573 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAISY ROWLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
MILFORD CITY, a Municipal Corpo-
ration of the State of Utah; R. L. 
KIZER as Mayor of Milford City; 
A. S. WHITTAI{ER, JOHN DAVIS, 
W. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and J. 
N. WESTON, as City Councilmen of 
said Milford City; V. M. BURNS, as 
City Recorder of said Milford City; 
E L W 0 0 D JEFFERSON an d 
ALENE JEFFERSON, his wife; and 
MIKE L. BRIMBERRY and DORO-
THY BRIMBERRY, his wife; FIRST 
DOE, SECOND DOE and THIRD 
DOE, 
Defendants, and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
No. 9182 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Mrs. Daisy Rowley, 
a resident and taxpayer of the City of Milford, Utah, 
acting in her own behalf and for and in behalf of all 
other taxpayers of said Milford City to have a certain 
purported sale of real property made by 11ilford City at 
a purported special meeting of the Mayor and four of 
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the City Council of :M:ilford City held on November 21, 
1958, at 8 p.m., to Elwood Jefferson and Mike L. Brim-
berry for a consideration of $2500.00 declared illegal and 
void, and to have a Quitclaim Deed for such property 
dated December 27, 1958, made by the Mayor and City 
Recorder of Milford City to said purported purchasers 
pursuant to authority of such meeting, declared to be 
null and void and ordered delivered up and cancelled, 
and requiring said purported purchaser to remove from 
said premises certain structures alleged to have been 
placed by them upon the premises, UPON THE FOL-
LOWING GROUNDS: 
I. That said special meeting of the Mayor and four 
City Councihnen of J\1ilford City held on November 21, 
1958, at 8 p.m. was not a legal meeting for the reason that 
no notice of said special meeting was given as required 
by law and by the City ordinances of Milford City, to 
City ·Councilman W. S. Bolton, who did not attend said 
meeting (Complaint Paragraph 9). 
2. That the two City Councilmen who voted in favor 
of such sale were influenced by considerations of their 
employment by one of the purported purchasers, or 
members of his immediate family, to vote in favor of 
the purported sale (Complaint Paragraph 9). 
3. That such purported sale was made for a grossly 
inadaequate consideration, without either soliciting other 
offers, or allowing other prospective purchasers to bid 
on the property (Complaint Paragraph 9). 
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4. That the property affected by such purported 
sale and other property was prior to on or about March 
9, 1939, dedicated as a public park and playground for 
Milford City by its governing body, namely, its Mayor 
and City Council, and that from on or about March 9, 
1939, down to the time of filing the plaintiff's Complaint 
the land affected by such purported sale has been dedi-
cated as and used as a public park and playground for 
the use and benefit of the inhabitants of Milford City, 
and such property so dedicated as a public park could not 
be legally sold at the time of such purported sale. 
(Complaint Paragraphs 5 and 9). 
The case was tried before the court sitting without 
a jury on October 22 to 24, 1959; both parties rested and 
the case was argued by counsel for both parties. On or 
about November 9, 1959, the defendants tendered their 
respective Supplemental Answers and moved the court 
for an Order permitting them to file and serve such 
Supplemental Answers. The court overruled and denied 
the motions and an intermediate appeal was taken by 
defendants from such Order. 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
The plaintiff agrees with the Statements of Facts 
set forth in Appellants' Brief, but invites an examination 
of the proposed Supplemental Answers for a detailed 
statement of all acts alleged to have occurred after the 
trial and to the time of filing of the motions for leave to 
file the Supplemental Answers. 
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STATEJ\1ENT OF POINTS 
FIRST : The tendered Supplemental Answers do not 
set forth facts material to the issues in this action, and 
hence should not be permitted to be filed. 
SECOND: The tendered Supplemental Answers set 
forth facts which when considered alone would constitute 
no defense to the cause of action pleaded in the Complaint, 
and which, if and when considered in connection with 
suggested possible future occurrences and possible future 
actions of Milford City Council at some subsequently 
called meeting in making a sale of the property to the 
defendants, Jefferson and Brimberry, or someone else, 
and ordering a Deed made to such purchaser or purch-
asers, which events may or may not occur if the pro-
ceedings in this action were ordered stayed, could at 
most give rise to a new and independent action, if the 
legality of such meeting or meetings and any Deed made 
pursuant to the authority thereof is questioned by a 
resident and taxpayer of Milford ·City, and hence the 
tendered Supplemental Answers should not be allowed 
to be filed, or any Order made staying the proceedings 
in this case to await the possible happening of such 
possible future events. 
THIRD : The rna tter of allowing the filing of sup-
plemental pleadings rests within the discretion of the 
trial court and the allowance or denial thereof will not 
be reversed on appeal in the absence of a manifest abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. There was no manifest 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying defend-
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ants motions to file the tendered Supplemental Answers. 
ARGUMENT 
FIRST : The tendered Supplemental Answers did 
not set forth facts which are material to the issues of 
the case, and hence their filing was properly disallowed. 
Rule 15(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
relating to the filing of supplemental pleadings 
is taken verbatum from Rule 15(d) of the Federal 
Rules, and in Sec. 455, page 945, Vol. 1, Barron 
and Holtzoff Federal Practice and Procedure 
it is stated in commenting on Rule 15(d) of the 
Federal Rules : A supplemental answer should 
be allowed to be filed only when the matter to be 
set forth embraces other and further defenses 
which arose after the original answer was filed 
and which relate to the plaintiff's claim for relief 
stated in the original complaint. 
Sec. 104-13-13 U.C.A. 1943, in force before the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted pro-
vided: Either party may be allowed to make a 
supplemental complaint, answer or reply, alleging 
facts material to the case, which have happened 
or have come to his knowledge after the filing 
of the former pleading. 
10 Hillyer Forms of Pleading and Practice, 
Pages 9572-9573. Supplemental Pleadings. Intro-
ductory Note: ". . . . The court may properly 
refuse leave to file a supplemental answer if 
timely application is not made therefor, or if 
the pleading sought to be filed does not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a defense, but not 
because of a mere defect in the statement of the 
defense." 
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BARTON et al. v. HACKNEY, 224 P 2d, 995, 
Kansas, 1950. 2. The filing of amended or sup-
plemental pleading is a matter within sound 
discretion of trial court, and to secure the reversal 
of ruling refusing to allow a party to amend or 
supplement his pleading, he must show affirmativ-
ely that the proposed pleading was material and 
that its refusal was a clear abuse of judicial 
discretion. 
Il\fPERIAL LAND CO. et al v. IMPERIAL 
IRR. DIST. et al. 16l P. 116, California, 1916. 
5. Facts to be alleged in a supplemental pleading 
must relate to and be material to the original 
case. 
The purported sale which the plaintiff seeks to have 
, declared illegal and void on the grounds alleged in the 
Complaint, is the purported sale made at a purported 
special meeting of the Mayor and four members of the 
Milford City Council held on November 21, 1958, at 
8 p.m., and the Deed which plaintiff seeks to have declared 
illegal and ordered delivered up and cancelled is the Deed 
dated December 27, 1958, identified in the plaintiff's 
Complaint. The issues joined are whether such special 
meeting was a legal meeting and whether the purported 
sale made at such special meeting was a valid sale, and 
whether the Deed issued to the defendants Jefferson 
and Brimberry under authority of such special meeting 
is a valid Deed or whether the same should be ordered 
delivered up and cancelled. The n1atters alleged in the 
proposed Supplemental Answers are not material to and 
can have no bearing upon these issues raised by the 
original pleadings. 
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If the special meeting and the Deed of Conveyance 
pursuant to purported authority of such meeting were 
illegal at their inception, then the facts pleaded in the 
Supplemental Answer could not affect the illegality of 
said special meeting and said Deed. If all of the facts 
pleaded in the Supplemental Answers could be proved 
these facts would be immaterial to the issues of the case. 
If the alleged special meeting was illegal at its inception, 
the additional facts pleaded in the Supplemental An-
swers, if proved, could not convert such illegal special 
meeting into a legal meeting, or breathe legality into the 
Deed which was illegal at its inception. The facts pleaded 
in the tendered Supplemental Answers are wholly im-
material to the issues in the case, and the motions to allow 
their filing were properly denied. 
SECOND : If the proceedings were ordered stayed, 
as suggested on page 12 of Appellants' Brief, and if at 
some time in the future some other meeting of the City 
Council of Milford City was held at which the property 
involved in this action was ordered sold to the defendants 
Jefferson and Brimberry, or to any other person or 
persons, and pursuant to such authority a conveyance 
of the property was made to such purchaser or purchas-
ers, such subsequent transactions could have no bearing 
on the legality of the special meeting held on November 
21, 1958~ at 8 p.m., or the purported sale made at such 
special meeting, or upon the legaility of the Deed dated 
December 27, 1958, at issue in this case, and the most 
that the happenings of such possible future events, when 
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coupled with the facts alleged in the tendered Supple-
mental Answers, could do, would be to give rise to a new 
and independent cause of action, if the legality thereof is 
questioned by a resident and taxpayer of Milford City. 
It is a matter of mere conjecture whether any meet-
ing or meetings of the City Council of Milford City will 
be held at any time in the future, at which the matter 
of the sale of the property in question will be considered 
and/ or authorized, or whether any officer or officers of 
Milford City will ever at any future time execute any 
purported Deed of Conveyance to anyone for the prop-
erty in question. If any such acts do occur and the legal-
ity of such acts is questioned, the same would of necessity 
have to be determined in a new and independent action. 
The filing of supplemental pleadings which allege 
matters which can only be determined in a new and inde-
pendent action should be denied. 
NATIONAL BANK OF ANADARKO v. 
FIRST N~T. BANK OF ANADARKO, 134 P. 
866, Oklahoma, 1913. 2. The facts embodied in a 
supplemental petition under the code must relate 
to the cause of action set forth in the original 
petition and must be in aid thereof. It is not 
proper to bring into a case by a supplemental 
petition new facts which have arisen since the 
action was commenced and which by themselves, if 
they are sufficient, constitute a new and independ-
ent cause of action, ·without reference to the facts 
alleged in the original pleading. In such case 
relief should be had by a new and independent 
action. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
STEPHANI v. ABBOTT et al. 30 P 2d, 1033, 
California, 1934. 4. Permission to file supple-
mental complaint rests in trial court's discretion, 
provided it is in furtherance of and consistent 
with original complaint and is not new or inde-
pendent cause of action. 
LE\VIS & QUEEN v. S. EDMONSON & 
SONS et al. 248 P 2d, 973, California, 1952. 12. 
A party should not be permitted to so amend his 
pleadings as to raise a new cause of action or a 
new defense. 
THIRD: Motions to file supplemental pleadings are 
addressed to the discretion of the trial court and their 
allowance or denial will not be reversed on appeal in the 
absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. 
Mazie ERICKSON, Executrix, etc., Plaintiff 
and Appellant, v. Clyde D. BOOTHE, Defendant 
and Respondent, 274 P 2d, 460, California, 1954. 
3. A motion to file a supplemental complaint is 
addressed to the sound legal discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be dis-
turbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of 
a manifest abuse of that discretion. 
Henry S. GREENSTONE, Plaintiff, Respon-
dent and Cross- Appellant, v. CLARETIAN 
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CLARE.TVILLE, 
California, a corporation, Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 343 P 2d, 161, California, 
1959. 16. It was within discretion of trial court 
to deny motion of defendant to file supplemental 
answer and reviewing court would not reverse 
order entered thereon unless abuse of discretion 
·was manifest in record.' 
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FEDERAL LIFE INS. CO. v. BARTLET'T, 
80 P 2d, 587, Oklahoma, 1938. 2. The allowance of 
filing of supplemental pleadings is within discre-
tion of trial court, and allowance or refusal of 
supplemental pleadings will not be reversed on 
appeal in absence of clear abuse of discretion. 
It was no abuse of discretion for the trial judge to 
refuse to grant defendants' motions for leave to file the 
Supplemental Answers which did not state facts con-
stituting any defense to the cause of action pleaded in 
the plaintiff's Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The matters alleged in the tendered Suppemental 
Answers are not material to the issues in this case and 
can constitute no defense to the cause of action pleaded 
in the Complaint. The matters referred to on page 12 of 
Appellants' Brief, which may or may not occur at some 
future time if the proceedings were stayed, could at most 
give rise to a new and independent action, if any such 
acts or events do occur at some future time, and their 
legality is then contested. Clearly there was no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying the 
motions of the defendants for leave to file their tendered 
Supplemental Answers. The decision of the trial judge 
in denying the motions is the only decision which could 
properly have been made. It would have been an abuse 
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of discretion on the part of the trial judge to have 
granted the motions, and the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respecfully submitted, 
DURHAM MORRIS 
Attorney for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
